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Legal Responses to Commercial Transactions Employing 
Novel Communications Media 
John Robinson Thomas 
It is becoming more and more important that the rules governing 
negotiations made by telegraph should be clearly defined and set-
tled, as contracts thus made are constantly increasing in number 
and magnitude. 
- Scott & Jarnagin, 
A Treatise Upon the Law of Telegraphs, 1868.1 
Electronic messaging systems and electronic data interchange are 
changing the way businesses negotiate and enter into contracts. 
These changes require a reexamination of fundamental contract 
principles. 
- American Bar Association, 
Report on Electronic Messaging, 1988.2 
More than a century ago, the telegraph3 revolutionized communi-
cations. For the first time, telegraphed messages spanned distances of 
thousands of miles, eliminating barriers of time and space. 4 The tele-
graph encouraged settlement of the West and the growth of cultural 
nationalism, and resulted in the development of the first significant 
industrial monopoly.5 This device also significantly affected com-
merce. Americans formed countless contracts using the telegraph, 
which quickly became an everyday tool of business. 6 Commercial 
users also rapidly adopted a later communications technology, tele-
1. WILLIAM L. Scorr & MILTON P. JARNAGIN, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF TELE· 
GRAPHS § 296 (1868). 
2. AMERICAN BAR AssN., ELECTRONIC MESSAGING, A REPORT OF THE Ao Hoc SUBCOM· 
MITTEE ON SCOPE OF THE U.C.C. 5 (1988) (Electronic Messaging Services Task Force) [herein-
after ELECTRONIC MESSAGING]. 
3. A telegraph employs electrical impulses which are transmitted and received as encoded 
signals. See generally Smith v. Downing, 22 F. Cas. 511 (C.C.D. Mass. 1850) (No. 13,036). 
Early telegraph systems were simple electrical circuits: when an operator closed a switch at the 
sending station, current flowed to the recipient's sounder and caused it to click. Telegraph com-
panies have since constructed more complex multiplexing and nationwide switching systems. To 
send a telegram, a user delivers a message to the office of the telegraph company. The company 
routes the message through telegraph lines to an office near the recipient, delivering it by hand or 
through the United States Postal Service. The delivered message is termed a "mailgram." See 
Herbert D. Benington, Electronic Mai/, in INNOVATIONS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 887, 903-
05 (Jamal T. Manassah ed., 1982). 
4. See, e.g., ROBERT L. THOMPSON, WIRING A CONTINENT: THE HISTORY OF THE TELE· 
GRAPH INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES (1947). 
5. Id. at viii. 
6. See, e.g., Tyler, Ullman & Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 60 III. 421, 440 (1871). 
1145 
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type systems. 7 Legal uncertainties hampered these early communica-
tions, however, because the new technologies challenged long 
established rules of contract law and evidence. Eventually, business 
users and courts developed practices and legal standards accommodat-
ing use of the new technologies. 
A similar revolution in communications technology is occurring 
today. Telefacsimile (fax) machines8 and electronic mail networks9 
have become commonplace features of our "Information Society."10 
Business users transmit information through these systems as readily 
7. Such systems are also known as telex or TWX machines. A teletype user purchases an 
electrical line, terminal, and teleprinter for individual use and subscribes to a communications 
service. Subscribers then initiate communications in a fashion similar to dialing a number on an 
ordinary telephone. The two terminals exchange unique identifiers, or "answerbacks," to verify 
the parties' identities. See BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE§ 1.1.3 
(1991). The sender then types a message on the teletypewriter, which converts the entered letters 
into a digital character code. The message is immediately transmitted, decoded and printed by 
the recipient's teleprinter. Id. 
8. Telefacsimile machines are also known as telecopiers or telefax machines. Bradford W. 
Hildebrandt, The Use of Facsimile by Law Firms, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 1986, at 4. Modern telefnc· 
simile technology allows the transmission of a fixed image as an electrical signal over telephone 
lines. See Secure Serv. Tech. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (E.D. 
Va. 1989); David A. Sokasits, Note, The Long Arm of the Fax: Service of Process Using Fax 
Machines, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 531 (1990). Users plug a telefacsimile 
machine, commonly known as a fax machine, into an ordinary telephone jack. The sender places 
documents into the telefacsimile machine, which converts the shades of black and white on the 
paper into digital signals. See, e.g., MICHAEL BANKS, UNDERSTANDING FAX AND ELEC· 
TRONIC MAIL 34-40 (1990). To transmit these signals, the sender dials the telephone number of 
the recipient's telefacsimile machine. The two telefacsimile machines communicate through vari-
ous protocols, such as Consultative Committee for International Telephone and Telegraph 
(CCITT) G3. See id. at 13-14. The receiving unit turns the signal back into a black-and-white 
document, usually through the oxidation of chemically treated, thermally activated paper by 
heated wires. See id. at 49-53. Recently introduced telefacsimile machines employ laser technol-
ogy to print on ordinary paper. Id. at 52-53. 
9. Electronic mail systems provide the ability to receive on a computer terminal a message 
originating on another terminal. See The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange - A 
Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645, 1649 (1990) (Electronic 
Messaging Services Task Force of the American Bar Association) [hereinafter Report and Model 
Trading Agreement]; ELECTRONIC MESSAGING, supra note 2, at 27. The terminals may be adja-
cent or thousands of miles apart. In a typical communication, a user types a message into a 
computer and routes it through a communications network to the "mailbox" of the recipient. 
See BANKS, supra note 8, at 119-44. The "mailbox" is a storage area for digitally encoded infor-
mation; the message remains there until the recipient checks the mailbox and reads his messages. 
Either party may store the message electronically, on magnetic media, or print the message onto 
paper. 
This Note does not distinguish between electronic mail and "electronic data interchange" 
(EDI). Although both media transmit messages between computers in the same fashion, elec-
tronic mail messages consist of ordinary text for individual users to read. In contrast, EDI 
messages are composed of computer-readable data that accounting and inventory systems can 
manipulate without human intervention. See ALVIN TOFFLER, POWERSHIFf 120-21 (1990). 
For sources that consider the differences between electronic mail and EDI, see WRIGHT, supra 
note 7; Report and Model Trading Agreement, supra note 9. 
10. See, e.g., Debra J. Mayberry, Introductory Note to FACSIMILE USERS' DIRECTORY at v 
(Debra J. Mayberry ed., 1990); CARL TOWNSEND, ELECTRONIC MAIL AND BEYOND 11 (1984). 
See generally YONEJI MASUDA, THE INFORMATION SOCIETY AS Posr-INDUSfRIAL SOCIETY 
(1981). 
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and quickly as by telephone, circumventing the delays and expense of 
delivery services. I I This capability allows parties to negotiate and 
enter into complex written agreements with all the efficiency that our 
fast-paced and global business environment demands. I2 These devices 
also expedite more mundane commercial relationships, such as invoice 
and purchase order submission. In this context, telefacsimile or elec-
tronic mail use reduces transmission delays, inventory costs, and the 
amount of paper produced in the transaction. I3 
Not surprisingly, legal rules have failed to maintain the pace of this 
rapid change in technology. Few courts have considered the use of 
these technologies in a commercial setting. As happened in the early 
days of telegraphy, the resulting legal uncertainty hinders develop-
ment of the new media and encourages inefficient business practices. 
Wary business users, unsure of how the law of evidence and contracts 
will govern electronically recorded transactions, often exchange copies 
of such communications by messenger or mail. I4 This resort to older, 
slower media allows contracting parties to be certain of the operative 
law, but eliminates the advantages that prompted the use of telefac-
simile and electronic mail systems. 
Many business users are less cautious, however, so courts will in-
creasingly encounter contracts recorded through these new media 
without reference to a traditional document. Is Pessimistic observers 
worry that the standards developed by courts will undercut the effi-
ciency of the technologies they embrace;I6 of course, these standards 
11. See, e.g., BANKS, supra note 8, at 16; Michael M. Sherry, How to Find the Fax That Fits 
the Firm -A Modem Necessity, NATL. L.J., Jan. 30, 1989, at 19 ("The [telefacsimile] machine is 
quickly becoming a requirement in the modern office."). 
12. An attorney recently noted that: 
The full power of the fax hit me when I was putting together a deal in Germany a few 
months ago. Three of the parties were in Bonn, the other in Las Vegas. 
We sent the German proposal to the American by fax. Five minutes later he returned 
the same document to us with some suggested changes in the wording. The Germans 
agreed, put their initials on the changes, and faxed back the American's fax. The Nevada 
party signed on the dotted line and returned the finalized contract. The whole process took 
only 20 minutes. 
Larry Johnson, The Joy of Fax. A.B.A. J., July 1989, at 102, 102. 
13. See Halina S. Dziewit et al., The Quest for the Paperless Office Electronic Contracting: 
State of the Art Possibility but Legal Impossibility?, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 75, 76-77 (1989) (noting, inter alia, that Levi-Strauss retailers have cut the amount of time 
needed to order supplies from one month to two weeks through the use of electronic mail 
systems). 
14. See Troublesome Legal Issues Threaten Industry Progress, NETWORK WORLD, June 13, 
1988, at 34; John Burgess, Those Fax-tastic Machines are Revolutionizing Office Communications, 
L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1988, at Dl2 ("One brake on [telefacsimile] growth is that the legal validity 
of the copies remains in question .... If there is ever a question, many companies will follow up a 
[telefacsimile] with an original by messenger or mail."). 
15. Courts have considered commercial documents transmitted by telefacsimile machines on 
only a few occasions. See infra notes 79-85, 170-71 and accompanying text. However, no pub-
lished opinion has yet contemplated a contract formed through electronic mail. 
16. See Michael Baum, Signed, Sealed, and • .. Delivered?, NETWORK WORLD, June 27, 
1988, at 53. 
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might also provide users with insufficient protection against fraud or 
transmission errors. Courts are not without guidance in this task, 
however, for they have struck balances between the concerns of effi-
ciency and accuracy since the early days of the telegraph and tele-
type.17 These decisions provide an appropriate framework for 
analyzing the use of modern communications technologies in a com-
mercial setting, but should not control the analysis alone. Although 
the media considered herein - telegraph, teletype, telefacsimile, and 
electronic mail - are steps along an increasingly sophisticated spec-
trum of communications systems, 18 thereby providing courts and 
scholars with ready analogies, 19 the distinctive features of each tech-
nology vitiate such comparisons. The more advanced systems often fit 
into the existing legal landscape less readily than did their simpler 
predecessors. A meaningful analysis of the legal issues must pay care-
ful attention to the specific characteristics of each of these 
technologies. 
This Note analyzes contemporary business practices and specific 
characteristics of the new media, and suggests a judicial response con-
sonant with courts' approaches to the earlier technologies of telegra-
phy and teletype. Part I examines the effect of the Statute of Frauds 
and rules of authentication upon contracts formed using these media. 
It concludes that documents produced by telefacsimile and electronic 
mail systems should be considered ordinary writings. Part II consid-
ers the Best Evidence Rule and argues that telefacsimiles and elec-
tronic mail transmissions should be considered the best evidence of the 
contract they memorialize. Part III evaluates doctrines of liability al-
location in the event of a transmission error while employing these 
media. It concludes that these doctrines are based upon theories of 
agency, common carriage, and contract law, rather than characteris-
tics of individual media, and that telefacsimile and electronic mail sys-
tems do not require reconsideration of these doctrines. This Note 
concludes that telefacsimile and electronic mail services, like earlier 
systems of telegraphy and teletype, should be recognized as legally ac-
ceptable media for contract formation. 
17. See infra notes 43-47, 55-57, 67-71, 152-58, 188-220 and accompanying text. 
18. See Report and Model Trading Agreement, supra note 9, at 1686; Brad Schultz, Electronic 
Mai/, U.S. BANKER, Feb. 1989, at 53; Henry Geller & Stuart Brotman, Electronic Alternatives to 
Postal Service, in COMMUNICATIONS FOR TOMORROW: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1980s, 
at 308, 320 (Glen 0. Robinson ed., 1978). 
19. See, e.g., People v. Hagan, 556 N.E.2d 1224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ajfd., 1991 WL 242340 
(Ill. 1991) (comparing telefacsimiles and telegrams); Beatty v. First Exploration Fund 1987 & 
Co., 25 B.C.L.R.2d 377 (1988) (comparing telefacsimiles and photocopies). 
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I. DEVICES FOR PROMOTING FRAUD? COMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGIES, AUTHENTICATION AND THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS 
1149 
Two legal rules, the Statute of Frauds and the evidentiary require-
ment of authentication, have hindered the use of telefacsimile and elec-
tronic mail systems in commercial transactions. 2° First, the Statute of 
Frauds requires certain contracts to be written and signed if they are 
to be legally binding.21 Unfortunately, these new technologies cannot 
transmit handwritten signatures, and the application of the term 
"writing" to telefacsimiled documents and intangible electronic 
messages is subject to debate. Second, the requirement of authentica-
tion, a condition precedent for the admissibility of evidence, "is satis-
fied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims."22 Parties can authenticate or-
dinary handwritten or typed documents by demonstrating that a 
claimed connection exists between an individual and the writing.23 A 
stricter standard of authentication might be warranted for newer tech-
nologies, however, if these media are unreliable or particularly prone 
to fraud. 
Since litigants must meet both the authentication and Statute of 
Frauds requirements to prove the existence of certain contracts, and 
each requirement limits the perpetration of fraud or occurrence of 
mistake, 24 this Part analyzes their impact upon new communications 
technologies together. Section I.A examines judicial responses to 
claims that contracts memorialized through telegrams or teletype 
failed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The section then considers how 
courts applied the evidentiary requirement of authentication to such 
documents. Se~tion I.B applies the principles expressed in these cases 
to the commercial use of telefacsimile and electronic mail systems. 
This Part argues that neither the Statute of Frauds nor the require-
ment of authentication should bar the admission of telefacsimiles or 
20. See BANKS, supra note 8, at 16; Jeffrey Rothfeder, The Scoop on Snooping: It's a Cinch, 
Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1989, at 82 ("My [telefacsimiled] signature ... isn't legally binding."); Robert 
J. Bruss, Real Estate Q&A, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1990, at K6 ("Faxed Counteroffer May Not Be 
Binding."). 
21. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1990) provides: 
[A] contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of 
action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale 
has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is 
sought or by his authorized agent or broker. 
The Statute of Frauds also applies to other sorts of contracts, such as those not to be performed 
within one year and those conveying on interest in land. Act for Prevention of Frauds and 
Perjury, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 4 (Eng.). 
22. FED. R. Evm. 901(a). 
23. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 218 (Edward W. Cleary et al., eds., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinaf-
ter McCoRMICK]. 
24. See 2 ARTHUR L. CoRBIN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS § 275 (1950) (Statute of Frauds); 
McCORMICK, supra note 23, § 218 (authentication). 
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electronic mail messages as evidence of contracts memorialized 
through these media. 
A. Telegraph and Teletype Systems 
1. The Writing Requirement of the Statute of Frauds 
The Statute of Frauds has ancient roots. Its framers, the English 
Parliament of 1677, believed that the rise of the action of assumpsit, 
which could result in judicial enforcement of oral contracts, had in-
creased the opportunity for fraud through perjured testimony. By 
mandating that "some note or memorandum in writing ... signed by 
the parties to be charged" exist for "contract[s] for the sale of any 
goods, wares and merchandi[s]es, for the price of ten pounds sterling 
or upwards ... to be good,"25 Parliament hoped to prevent imposing 
contractual obligations on unconsenting or unwary individuals.26 Sub-
sequent codifications of the law of commercial transactions substan-
tially retained the Statute. The Uniform Sales Act demands a "note or 
memorandum in writing" as evidence of certain contracts,27 while the 
Uniform Commercial Code requires merely a "writing."28 
Despite considerable judicial experience in construing the simply 
worded Statute of Frauds,29 the absence of a definition for the term 
"writing" within the Statute of Frauds creates uncertainty when ap-
plied to documents memorialized on unusual media. The drafters of 
the original English statute probably used the term to mean the notes 
made by merchants in the ordinary course ofbusiness.30 But changing 
technologies and unusual circumstances have resulted in the submis-
sion of other sorts of documents before courts. These cases often in-
25. 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 17 (1677) (Eng.). The English Parliament has repealed § 17 of the 
Statute of Frauds. See CORBIN, supra note 24, § 275 (Supp. 1991). 
26. See CoRBIN, supra note 24, § 275 ("The purpose of [the Statute] was to prevent the 
foisting of an obligation of specified classes by perjury upon one who had never assented to 
assume it."). 
27. The Uniform Sales Act provides: 
A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five hundred 
dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of 
the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive the same, 
or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or 
memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be charged or his 
agent in that behalf. 
UNIF. SALES ACT § 4, 1 U.L.A. 17 (1922). 
28. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1990). Although this discussion is limited to the Statute of Frauds, 
the U.C.C. also has a writing requirement in other sections, e.g., §§ 2A-201(1)(b) (lease con-
tracts), 7-202(2) (warehouse receipts), 9-203(1)(a) (security arrangements). The U.C.C. is the 
first version of the Statute of Frauds to define "writing." Section 1-201(46) provides that the 
term writing "includes printing, typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible 
form." U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (1990). 
29. The Statute of Frauds has been "interpreted and applied by the courts in tens of 
thousands of cases." CORBIN, supra note 24, § 275. 
30. See E. Rabel, The Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History, 63 LAW Q. RBV. 
174, 182-83 (1947). 
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volve wills, which are also governed by the writing requirement of the 
Statute of Frauds.31 Parties have proffered an assortment of unlikely 
substitutes for paper and ink, such as an eggshell, 32 corn bin, 33 
bedpost,34 sailor's identification disk,35 tractor fender,36 and other sun-
dry objects37 as wills for probate. In these cases, courts have read the 
Statute liberally, and considered these unusual submissions within the 
writing requirement. 38 
Another early decision considering a more common means of com-
munication, the lead pencil, further demonstrates courts' broad read-
ing of the Statute. In Clason v. Bailey, 39 the court enforced a contract 
written in pencil under the writing requirement of the Statute of 
Frauds. It considered the essence of writing to be the expression of 
ideas by letters rather than the "mode or manner of impressing those 
letters."40 The decision acknowledged the development of communi-
cations technology, reviewing means of writing such as iron pen on 
stone, metal, and waxed tablets, and finally ink on paper. The court 
added that the acceptable means of writing have "been left to be gov-
erned by public convenience and usage; and as far as questions have 
arisen on this subject, the Courts have, with great latitude and liberal-
ity, left the parties to their own discretion."41 A reference to a require-
ment of "durability and safety" of the completed writings tempered 
this dictum. 42 
Consistent with these earlier readings of the Statute of Frauds, 
courts rapidly accepted telegraphed messages as a valid means of me-
morializing a contract. One such court, rejecting arguments that tele-
grams were not writings, found 
it makes no difference whether ... [the telegraph] operator writes the 
off er or the acceptance in the presence of his principal and by his express 
direction, with a steel pen an inch long attached to an ordinary pen-
31. 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 5 (1677) (Eng.). 
32. In re Goods of Barnes, 136 L.T.R. 380 (1927). 
33. Sidney T. Miller, Notes on Some Interesting Wills, 12 Mice. L. REv. 467, 468 (1914). 
34. Id. 
35. A Microscopic Will, 66 Souc. J. 638 (1922). 
36. W.M. Elliott, Case and Comment, 26 CANADIAN B. REv. 1242 (1948). 
37. See VIRGIL M. HARRIS, ANCIENT, CURIOUS, AND FAMOUS WILLS 167-69 (1912) (dis-
cussing wills prepared on a door, a card tom from a freight train, a collar box, and wrapping 
paper). 
38. See Houston P. Lowry, Does Computer Stored Data Constitute a Writing for the Purposes 
of the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Wills?, 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 93, 94-95 
(1982). 
39. 14 Johns. 484 (N.Y. 1817). 
40. 14 Johns. at 491. 
41. 14 Johns. at 491. 
42. The common law has gone so far to regulate writings, as to make it necessary that a 
deed should be written on paper or parchment, and not on wood or stone. This was for the 
sake of durability and safety; and this is all the regulation that the law has prescribed. 
14 Johns. at 491. 
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holder, or whether his pen be a copper wire a thousand miles long. In 
either case the thought is communicated to the paper by the use of the 
finger resting upon the pen; nor does it make any difference that in one 
case common record ink is used, while in the other case a more subtle 
fluid, known as electricity, performs the same office.43 
Courts usually paid little attention to the reliability of telegraphy when 
considering the fit of telegrams within the Statute of Frauds; those that 
did favorably compared telegraphy to the postal system. 44 The courts 
acknowledged that failure to accept telegrams as writings under the 
Statute of Frauds "would certainly impair the usefulness of modern 
appliances to modern business, tend to hamper trade, and increase the 
expense thereof."45 Little dissent accompanied this rule; indeed, later 
decisions in this area seldom questioned the categorization of tele-
grams as writings. 46 
Following these analyses, courts also were willing to enforce con-
tracts made using teletype machines under the writing requirement of 
the Statute of Frauds. As with telegraphy, courts took "a realistic 
view of modern business practices" and held that teletyped messages 
satisfied the writing requirement.47 
2. The Signature Requirement of the Statute of Frauds 
In addition to a writing requirement, the Statute of Frauds re-
quires valid contracts to bear the defendant's signature. As with the 
writing requirement, courts have often considered aflixations that are 
outside the ordinary meaning attached to the term "signature" - a 
person's name handwritten in ink. Acceptable substitutes include 
marks;48 stamped,49 printed,50 and typewritten51 names; and letter-
heads.52 Courts found each of these variations to be a "signature," 
relying upon the parties' intent to employ the handwritten signature 
43. Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487, 488 (1869). 
44. See, e.g., Western Twine Co. v. Wright, 78 N.W. 942, 943 (S.D. 1899) ("As a rule, to 
which an exception is very rare, all letters and all telegrams with equal certainty reach their 
destination, and, the reasonable intendments with reference to each being identical, the same 
legal presumption may well be entertained as to both."). Courts often painted a different picture 
of telegraphy when considering the prospective liability of telegraph companies for transmission 
errors. See infra Part III. 
45. Brewer v. Horst-Lachmund Co., 60 P. 418, 420 (1900). 
46. See, e.g., Smith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138, 146-47 (1880). 
47. See, e.g., Joseph Denuzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117, 128-29 (S.D. Cal. 1948), 
vacated, 89 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Cal. 1950), reinstated, 188 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 
342 U.S. 820 (1951). 
48. See In re Walker's Estate, 42 P. 815, 816 (Cal. 1895). 
49. See In re Deep River Natl. Bank, 47 A. 675, 677 (Conn. 1900). 
SO. See Wright v. Seattle Grocery Co., 177 P. 818, 820 (Wash. 1919); Berryman v. Childs, 
153 N.W. 486, 487-88 (Neb. 1915). 
51. See Smith v. Milliken Bros., 93 N.E. 184, 184-85 (N.Y. 1910). 
52. See Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546, 553-54 (1882). 
March 1992] Note - Novel Media 1153 
substitute as an endorsement.53 
Consonant with this approach, the law quickly recognized tele-
graphed "signatures" and approved them within the Statute of 
Frauds. 54 A recent decision illustrated the rationale of these early 
cases by considering "[t]he telegram with the typed signature of de-
fendant's name [to have] emanated from the defendant which is re-
sponsible for it."55 In addition to focusing upon the parties' intent, 
courts also deferred to the routine business use of telegrams as a con-
tracting medium. Courts were similarly quite willing to accept both 
teletyped "signatures" delivered in teletypewritten form56 and a tele-
type terminal's answerback57 as signatures within the Statute of 
Frauds. 
3. Authentication 
The law of evidence requires that writings must be "authenticated" 
to be admitted into evidence. 58 Although the rule is said to "defy pre-
cise definition,"59 authentication requires proof that an article is what 
the offering party claims it is. 60 A party seeking to authenticate a 
message may employ direct evidence to link a document with a per-
son. 61 Witnesses, for example, may testify they observed an individual 
signing a letter or contract. 62 A court may also accept authenticating 
evidence such as lay or expert testimony regarding the author's hand-
writing style.63 Additionally, such parties may employ circumstantial 
evidence, such as the document's location or accompanying items, to 
authenticate that writing. 64 Further, under the reply letter doctrine, 
courts will admit a letter into evidence as a reply if it responds, with-
53. See also General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anacone, 197 A.2d 506, 512-13 (Me. 
1964) (holding that an agent's facsimile signature qualifies as a "signature" if it is affixed both 
with intent to endorse and with authority). The U.C.C. drafters subsequently codified this re-
quirement. See U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1991) (providing that" '[s]igned' includes any symbol exe-
cuted or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing"). 
54. See Trevor v. Wood, 36 N.Y. 307 (1867); Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487 (1869). 
55. La Mar Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Credit & Commodity Corp., 216 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1961). 
56. See Joseph Denuzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Cal. 1948), vacated, 89 F. 
Supp. 962 (S.D. Cal. 1950), relnstated, 188 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.), cert. denled, 342 U.S. 820 (1951); 
Klein v. PepsiCo, Inc., 845 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1988). 
57. See Clipper Maritime Ltd. v. Shirlstar Container Transp. Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 546, 554 
(1987); Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Intl. Corp., 406 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), ajfd., 540 
F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1976). 
58. FED. R. Evm. 901(a) ("The requirement of authentication or identification [is] a condi-
tion precedent to admissibility ..•• "). 
59. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 218. 
60. FED. R. Evm. 901(a). 
61. McCoRMICK, supra note 23, § 219. 
62. EDWARD J. INWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 37 (2d ed. 1989). 
63. Id. at 38. 
64. MCCoRMICK, supra note 23, § 222 (When "no direct evidence of authenticity of any type 
exists or can be found [r]esort must then be had to circumstantial proof."). 
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out unusual delay, to a previous letter. 65 This doctrine is based upon 
the judicial assumption that the mails are reliable. 66 
Soon after the introduction of telegraphy, courts faced cases chal-
lenging them to develop a concept of authentication suited to the char-
acteristics of the technology. Courts might have demanded elaborate 
testimony on such matters as the validity and acceptance of the scien-
tific principles which underlie telegraph technology, the reliability of 
the particular telegraph system involved, or the dependability of the 
operators who entered messages for transmission. Instead, courts ap-
plied the previously established rules of authentication for writings. 67 
Because concern for the prevention of fraud and mistake underlie both 
the Statute of Frauds and the requirement of authentication, this re-
sult was consistent with the qualification of telegrams as "writings" 
within the Statute. 68 If courts considered telegrams as safe and as du-
rable69 as other writings for purposes of the Statute of Frauds, they 
could also readily subject telegrams to the standards of authentication 
developed for writings. Courts also allowed telegrams to be authenti-
cated in two ways not generally apposite to other documents. First, 
parties could introduce telegraph company authorization forms, on 
which customers would write the message they wished to send. 70 Ad-
ditionally, parties could call an employee of the telegraph company as 
an authenticating witness.71 
Despite acceptance of telegrams under the Statute of Frauds, a mi-
nority of courts disagreed with the notion of telegraphy as a reliable 
medium worthy of the same evidentiary standards as handwritten doc-
uments. 72 The lack of confidentiality of telegrams, accompanied by 
the increased opportunity for fraud,73 also concerned courts. Not only 
were such messages read by the recipient, but employees of the tele-
graph company also had access to transmitted messages. Occasion-
ally, decisions reflected this caution; for instance, some jurisdictions 
65. Id. § 225. 
66. INWINKELRIED, supra note 62, at 39. 
67. 29 AM. JuR. 2o Evidence § 883 (1967) ("A telegram, like any other document, is admis-
sible in evidence only where authenticated. There must be some competent proof that it is genu-
ine and that it was written and sent by the person whose name it bears.") (footnotes omitted). 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47. 
69. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
70. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 10 F.2d 339, 350 (9th Cir.), a.ffd., 273 U.S. 593 (1926), 
71. See, e.g., Hall v. Western Union Tel. Co., 162 F. 657 (7th Cir. 1908); Peterman v. Ver-
mont Sav. Bank, 159 So. 598 (La. 1935). 
72. McCORMICK, supra note 23, § 225. 
73. Id. One commentator noted: 
[While] it is unnecessary to disclose the intelligence contained in a letter to any one to effect 
its transportation by mail, it is absolutely necessary to disclose intelligence to at least two 
operators to effect its transmission by telegraph. Consequently, the telegraph offers far 
greater opportunity to deliver fraudulent answers to inquiries than the mail does. 
MORRIS GRAY, A TREATISE ON COMMUNICATION BY TELEGRAPH§ 135 (1885). 
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refused to authenticate reply telegrams as they would reply letters. 74 
Such telegrams had to be authenticated like ordinary telegrams. Later 
decisions, responding to the increasing reliability and acceptance of 
this medium, rejected this exception to the 'reply letter doctrine. 75 
Courts also broadly accepted teletyped messages as writings and held 
them to the same standards of authentication as more traditional 
writings. 76 
Contemporary judicial attitudes toward contracts memorialized 
through telegraph or teletype are thus straightforward with regard to 
the Statute of Frauds and authentication requirements. Courts con-
sider such contracts as writings within the Statute of Frauds, and will 
also accept typed names as substitutes for handwritten signatures. 
Additionally, some decisions regard teletype terminals' answerbacks 
as signatures. Parties may also authenticate both sorts of messages as 
readily as more traditional writings, without regard to a detailed 
showing of the technical underpinnings or reliability of the media. 
B. Novel Communications Media, the Statute of Frauds and 
Authentication 
1. Telefacsimile Machines.. 
For both the Statute of Frauds and the authentication require-
ments, the threshold question is whether courts will adopt telefac-
similes as writings. If so, the writing portion of the Statute would be 
satisfied, and adoption of the standard of authentication that exists for 
other writings would follow. 77 The policy of deference to commercial 
use displayed in the telegraph and teletype cases may lead contempo-
rary judges to accept telefacsimiles as writings also. The nearly uni-
versal presence and extensive use of telefacsimile machines in modern 
offices supports finding telefacsimiled messages to be "writings." The 
Uniform Commercial Code also supports acceptance: a telefacsimile 
should logically be considered an "intentional reduction to tangible 
form."78 Further, a court will likely imply assent to one who telefac-
similes a document bearing his signature to a commercial partner. 
74. See Drexel v. True, 74 F. 12 (8th Cir. 1896); Smith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138, 146 (1880); 
Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487, 488 (1869); Chester v. State, 5 S.W. 125 (Texas Crim. App. 
1887). 
75. See McCoRMICK, supra note 23, § 225 ("The contrary view, that the inference of authen-
ticity of the reply telegram is substantial and sufficient, seems more reasonable and expedient.") 
(citations omitted). 
76. See, e.g., Guynn v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, 589 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1979). But see 
Joseph J. van Dort, Bank Guarantee by Telex, 14 INTL. Bus. LAW. 173 (June 1986), describing a 
Dutch case where a bank allegedly issued a guarantee by teletype. The court accepted expert 
testimony regarding the ease of altering the indicated source of the message when the parties fail 
to employ special security measures. The court thus ruled that the bank was not responsible for 
the teletyped guarantee. 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69. 
78. U.C.C. § 1-201 (1990) (defining "writing"). 
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The few courts considering the application of the Statute of Frauds 
and authentication to telefacsimiles have reached this result. 79 These 
decisions are notable for their brevity as well as their outcome. In 
Beatty v. First Exploration Fund 1987 & Co., 80 the court simply 
equated telefacsimiles to photocopies, and found no greater uncer-
tainty or opportunity for fraud through the use of telefacsimiles than 
for original documents. The court wrote that technological improve-
ments in communication "should be considered, and, unless there are 
compelling reasons for rejection, they should be encouraged, applied, 
and approved."81 In People v. Hagan, 82 the court faced a choice be-
tween the standard for telegrams or the standard for computer records 
as the appropriate authentication standard of telefacsimiled docu-
ments. In most jurisdictions, telegrams are authenticated like any 
other writing. 83 Computer records, however, require proof that the 
"generating system was standard, unmodified, and properly oper-
ated. "84 Although the Hagan court did not select a standard, it did 
consider a telefacsimile "more trustworthy than the telegram since it 
does not rely on a transcribing of the document at the receiving 
end. " 85 This conclusion supports applying the lower standard of writ-
ings for telefacsimiles, rather than the standard of computer records. 
The Beatty and Hagan courts analyzed telefacsimiles by measuring 
them against earlier media for which well-established legal norms ex-
ist. Both concluded that the reliability of the new technology rivals 
that of telegraphy and photocopying, and that telefacsimiles therefore 
similarly warrant approval under the Statute of Frauds and the stan-
dards of authentication for ordinary writings. Such comparisons must 
carefully consider the specific characteristics of the contrasted media, 
however. The level of trust commercial users place in a technology, 
often referred to in earlier telegraph and teletype cases but not consid-
ered in Beatty or Hagan, offers another measure of dependability. The 
overwhelming business acceptance of devices such as telefacsimile ma-
chines strongly evidences their trustworthiness. Commercial accept-
ance does not end the inquiry, however, for legal standards may 
dictate, in addition to being dictated by, business practices. Courts 
79. See, e.g., Hessenthaler v. Farzin, 564 A.2d 990 (Pa. Super. 1989); Bazak Intl. Corp. v. 
Mast Indus., 535 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1989). 
80. 25 B.C.L.R.2d 377 (1988). This decision actually concerns the validity of telefacsimiled 
proxies under a limited partnership agreement requiring proxies to be signed and in writing. 
Because these requirements are identical to those imposed by the Statute of Frauds, an analysis 
of this decision is relevant. 
81. 25 B.C.L.R.2d at 385. 
82. 556 N.E.2d 1224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ajfd., 1991 WL 242340 (Ill. 1991). The case con-
cerned falsified banking records which had been transmitted by a telefacsimile machine. The 
court upheld the defendant's conviction on one court of forgery. 
83. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 883 (1967). 
84. 556 N.E.2d at 1239. 
85. 556 N.E.2d at 1239. 
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should exercise caution when approving new technologies, and fully 
examine their unique characteristics when considering the possibility 
of mistake, fraud, and perjury. 
a. Difficulties with telefacsimile machines. Telefacsimile ma-
chines possess unique characteristics that may increase the opportu-
nity for mistake or fraud as compared with ordinary writings. These 
factors are not, however, sufficiently distressing to warrant the re-
moval of telefacsimiles from the scope of the term "writing." The first 
distinguishing feature, the tendency for telefacsimiled documents to 
deteriorate, departs significantly from ordinary paper, and works 
against the requirement that a writing must be both durable and safe 
to be within the Statute of Frauds. 86 Current telefacsimile technology 
prints the recipient's document through the oxidation of chemically 
treated, thermally activated paper.87 This treatment renders the re-
sulting document susceptible to darkening. Some observers indicate 
that telefacsimiles will deteriorate in less than a week when exposed to 
bright light, and even those safely stored can become unreadable in 
two years or less. 88 
In addition to generating fragile documents, telefacsimile machines 
sometimes skip lines, paragraphs, or even entire pages during the 
transmission process. 89 A court recently faced this problem in Ameri-
can Multimedia Inc. v. Dalton Packaging, 90 where a supplier failed to 
receive a page of a telefacsimiled purchase order. The missing page 
contained an arbitration clause, which became relevant when the pur-
chaser received allegedly defective goods. Since the disputing parties 
had previously made use of the same purchase order form, and the 
portion of the document received referred to the missing page, the 
court held the supplier had notice of the arbitration clause. The reso-
lution of this issue becomes more difficult when a course of dealing 
rationale does not apply. 
A third troubling characteristic of telefacsimile technology is the 
heightened opportunity for individuals to commit fraud by altering 
documents. The use of original documents, rather than telefacsimiles, 
provides greater assurance that the document is accurate and unmodi-
fied. For this reason, the banking industry in particular has become 
increasingly wary of accepting payment orders via telefacsimile.91 
86. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
87. See supra note 8. 
88. See Belden Menkus, Bits and Pieces: Overview of Telecommunications News, 35 MODERN 
OFF. TECH., Jan. 1990, at 150; see also David B. Pearson & Douglas P. Sauter, Assessing the 
Risks of Fax Confirmations, J. Acer., Mar. 1990, at 75, 78. 
89. See Benjamin Wright, Fax Pacts: Contracting via Fax Machines Could Leave the User on 
Shaky Legal Ground, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 5, 1990, at 69. 
90. 540 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1989). 
91. See Beware/ Fax Attacks/, A.B.A. BANKING J., June 1990, at 52, 53. 
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Anecdotes describe thieves cutting signatures from company commu-
nications, attaching them to payment orders, and sending the order to 
the bank.92 The quality of telefacsimiled documents makes these 
frauds difficult to detect, even if accepted sciences such as signature 
analysis are employed.93 Current telefacsimile technology is also sus-
ceptible to page-swapping94 and alteration of the indicated source of 
the telefacsimile. 9s 
b. Responses to these concerns. Although the propensity of 
telefacsimiles toward darkening, skipped lines or pages, and unde-
tected alteration is worrisome, these characteristics should not render 
telefacsimiled contracts invalid under the Statute of Frauds, or in-
crease the required standard of authentication beyond that of ordinary 
writings. First, darkened documents are often difficult to read, but 
they do not noticeably increase the opportunity for fraud, perjury, or 
mistake, the chief concern of these standards. Courts have accepted 
far more fragile media in the past.96 Furthermore, courts have held 
that even writings which are lost or destroyed satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds.97 Telefacsimiles rendered unreadable through aging or expo-
sure to light fit easily within this category. The self-interest of parties 
who have selected the telefacsimile as a contracting medium and are 
aware of its limitations provides an additional safeguard. These par-
ties are capable of recording important telefacsimiled documents on a 
more stable medium, by photocopying or other techniques. 98 
Skipped pages or other telefacsimile errors are also not so perva-
sive as to disqualify telefacsimiled documents as writings for the pur-
poses of the Statute of Frauds or authentication. Mistakes occur in 
other means of communication as well. Mailed documents get dam-
aged or fail to arrive, telegrams become garbled in transmission, and it 
is sometimes difficult to hold a conversation over the telephone. 
Nonetheless, contracting parties continue to rely heavily on these me-
dia, for such events are recognized as exceptions to what are generally 
reliable means of communication. Courts have acknowledged this ac-
ceptance as a compelling reason for recognition of a given technology 
under the Statute of Frauds. A similar awareness of the tremendous 
92. Id.; see also Benjamin Wright, A Signature Is a Signature, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 5, 
1990, at 70. 
93. See Patricia Bordman, Note, Telefacsimile Documents: A Survey of Uses in the Legal 
Setting, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1361, 1364-65 (1990); Dziewit et al., supra note 13, at 86. 
94. See Wright, supra note 89, at 69 ("A dishonest [telefacsimile] recipient could fabricate a 
page and substitute it for one of the genuine pages."). 
95. See Beware/ Fax Attacks/, supra note 91, at 52. 
96. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
97. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 137 (1979) ("The loss or destruction of a 
memorandum does not deprive it c>f effect under the Statute."). 
98. See, e.g., BANKS, supra note 8, at 50. 
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business acceptance of the telefacsimile, rather than a casual compari-
son with telegraphy or photocopiers, should guide courts in setting 
standards of authentication.99 
The final distinguishing feature of telefacsimiles, their susceptibil-
ity to undetected alteration, presents a question of approach with re-
spect to the Statute of Frauds. Some courts and commentators have 
considered the problem of fraudulent document changes not as a Stat-
ute of Frauds issue, but as one of contract formation. 100 This conclu-
sion sidesteps the principle role of the Statute of Frauds, the 
preservation of the terms of a contract. If the submitted memoran-
dum presents a significant likelihood of fraud, the Statute of Frauds 
cannot truly be satisfied. The better analysis looks first to the primary 
thrust of the Statute: "whether the contract was made as alleged and 
whether there is any substantial danger that it is being established by 
perjury and fraud." 101 A Statute of Frauds defense to telefacsimiled 
contracts, however, should not necessarily be recognized under this 
approach. Other sorts of duplicative techniques present greater diffi-
culties. Carbon copies, for example, fail to reflect changes in the origi-
nal document once detached, but have long been accepted as 
memoranda within the Statute of Frauds.102 
Concern for the possibility of fraudulent alteration also motivates 
the authentication requirement for writings. Only if telefacsimiles 
present a sufficiently greater opportunity for fraud than other docu-
ments, such as telegrams or handwritten letters, is a stricter standard 
of authentication justified. Although telefacsimiles present possibili-
ties for alteration which were not feasible with earlier technologies, 
these opportunities do not justify imposing a stricter standard of au-
thentication. Indeed, no special authentication standards have been 
promulgated for carbon copies, 103 which offer greater opportunities 
for fraud than telefacsimiles. Further, many telefacsimile machines 
have the ability to generate transaction reports, which provide a rec-
ord of the documents sent and received, the date and time of the trans-
missions, the length of the telefacsimiled documents, and the phone 
number of the other party.104 These reports provide an additional de-
99. Of course, once a transmission error has occurred, interest arises in which party should 
bear a consequential loss. See infra Part III for a discussion of the potential liability of the 
telefacsimile manufacturer in such circumstances. 
100. See, e.g., Rork v. Las Olas Co., 23 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1945); Report and Model Trading 
Agreement, supra note 9, at 1683-84. 
101. CoRBIN, supra note 24, § 522. 
102. See Panko v. Alessi, 524 A.2d 930, 931 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). 
103. See, e.g., Young v. Sorenson, 121 Cal. Rptr. 236 (Ct. App. 1975); Ma-Jet-le Furnace 
Corp. v. Great S. Trucking Co., 93 S.E.2d 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956); Furrer v. State Indus. 
Accident Commn. of Or., 353 P.2d 565 (Or. 1960). Note that carbon copies, like telegraph, 
teletype, telefacsimile, and electronic mail transmissions, often raise Best Evidence Rule issues. 
See infra Part II. 
104. See BANKS, supra note 8, at 56-57. 
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gree of protection against fraud during commercial telefacsimile 
use.1os 
The increasing reliability of newer telefacsimile machines should 
lessen the opportunity for fraud and mistake. For instance, the recent 
introduction of telefacsimile machines which employ ordinary, rather 
than thermally activated, paper has lessened worries of sudden deteri-
oration of important telefacsimiled documents. 106 Innovations such as 
these are often expensive, however. Even as prices drop, older forms 
of the technology frequently find their way into new markets.101 The 
rapid spread of refinements should not be relied upon to resolve prob-
lematic aspects of new technologies. Courts will continue to encoun-
ter, and must be sure to recognize, these unique traits of telefacsimile 
communication for years to come. 
2. Electronic Mail 
As with telefacsimiles, the threshold question is whether contracts 
memorialized through electronic mail constitute legal "writings." No 
court has yet considered this issue. 108 Courts' broad interpretation of 
"writing" in other contexts strongly indicates that electronic mail 
should fare equally well 1mder the Statute of Frauds. The novel char-
acteristics of this medium, however, require an even broader interpre-
tation of the Statute than for any established technology. For 
example, transactions conducted through electronic mail do not neces-
sarily involve a "tangible form" as the Uniform Commercial Code re-
quires.109 Unlike telegraph, teletype, and telefacsimile technologies, 
the transmitted data may remain in electronic form, or be stored on 
magnetic media rather than paper. The signature requirement may 
also prove troubling. Either a mere indication of the message's source 
may be deemed to constitute a "signature," or some other aspect of the 
technology must suffice. 
Despite the unique features of electronic mail, the writing require-
ment of the Statute of Frauds should be less of a concern for contracts 
memorialized through this media than it may initially appear. 
Although electronic mail transmissions do not necessarily involve 
writings, users may employ these computer systems to generate a pa-
105. See Zink Communications v. Elliott, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14784, at 30-32, 38 (judi-
cial treatment of telefacsimile machine's transaction report); Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Ybarra, 751 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Texas Ct. App. 1988) (same). 
106. See How to Buy a Fax Machine. 1 HOME & OFFICE FAX BUYER'S GUIDE 11, 13 (1990); 
see also Tracey Tucker, Did You Get My Fax: Proof of Content and Delivery Raises Questions of 
Security and Legality, 8 TELECONNECT, no. 7 at 38 (July 1990). 
107. See Don Dailey, The Fax Boom of the '90s, 1 HOME & OFFICE FAX BUYER'S GUIDE 5, 
8 (1990) (reporting prediction of a $300 telefacsimile machine designed for home use by 1993). 
108. See WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 16.4.4. 
109. u.c.c. § 1-201(46) (1990). 
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per record at any point in the process.110 Electronic mail systems are 
more flexible than the other communications systems considered here, 
in that paper may be generated, but more efficient storage mechanisms 
may be used as well. 111 Most of the paper produced by these systems 
will likely be generated at some time following the start of the con-
tract, such as when a conflict has arisen. This characteristic is not 
necessarily a fatal flaw under the Statute of Frauds, however; dilatory 
memorialization of contracts has not voided such documents in the 
past.112 
The signature requirement of the Statute of Frauds is not resolved 
so readily. In the normal course of events an electronic message can-
not be accompanied by a handwritten signature. But several possible 
replacements for a normal signature seem appropriate, including a 
confirmation technology resembling a teletype terminal's answerback 
feature, 113 the user's use of a network access code, 114 perhaps in com-
bination with the input of a "send" or "post" command which results 
in message transmission, 115 or simply the inclusion of the sender's 
typewritten name at the close of the message. 
Of these options, the last is most desirable. The acceptance of an-
swerbacks as signature substitutes for teletyped documents is more 
troubling than judicial approval of telegraphed names as signatures. 
Every teletype communication includes an exchange of answerbacks, 
not merely those where an individual intends to validate a contract.116 
Similarly, user access codes and system commands merely provide 
users with the capability to send and to receive messages. The intent 
to be bound by the terms of the contract, readily inferred from the 
signing of a document, should not be so implied from using the neces-
sary elements of a technology. 117 In contrast, a judicial determination 
that a voluntarily typed name accompanying an electronic mail 
110. Of course, the integrity of the system's storage, retrieval and printing mechanisms be-
comes increasingly important here as well. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. 
111. See Report and Model Trading Agreement, supra note 9, at 1686. 
112. See Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551, 553 (N.Y. 1952) (Payroll 
cards, prepared months after an employment contract was entered into, "unquestionably consti-
tute •.. memorand[a] under the [S]tatute."). 
113. Internet, a national electronic mail network, has proffered draft standards for authenti-
cation of messages based on public key encryption. "Developers of the technology say the en-
cryption will provide users with 'digital envelopes' that cannot be opened except by the 
addressee, and the contents will have 'digital signatures' that cannot be forged." Vin McLellan, 
Data Network to Use Code to Insure Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, late city ed., Mar. 21, 1989, at D5. 
114. A password may be substituted for the access code. See Report and Model Trading 
Agreement, supra note 9, at 1687. 
115. See ELECTRONIC MESSAGING, supra note 2, at 16. 
116. In Clipper Maritime Ltd. v. Shirlstar Container Transp. Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 546, 554 
(1987), the court distinguished between the answerback of the sender and that of the receiver. 
The latter would not be considered a signature since it "only authenticates the document and 
does not convey approval of the contents." 
117. See Report and Model Trading Agreement, supra note 9, at 1680 n.148. 
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message constitutes a signature comports with case law approving sig-
nature variants that indicate acceptance of a contract.118 
The courts' unwillingness to upset settled business practice 
through rulings on the technical requirements of the law of evidence 
lends additional support to the conclusion that contracts made and 
recorded on electronic mail systems should survive scrutiny under the 
Statute of Frauds. The use of electronic mail in a commercial context 
is widespread, 119 and some observers have predicted a staggering in-
crease of use within the next five years.120 This trend should bolster 
legal findings that electronic mail is a legally valid commercial 
medium. 
In contrast, commercial acceptance does not necessarily justify in-
clusion of electronic mail messages within the ordinary authentication 
standards for writings. Since such messages are ordinarily stored in 
the memory unit of general purpose computer systems, 121 their intro-
duction into evidence raises questions both of origin and manner of 
storage. As such, electronic mail messages should be subject to both 
the same authentication standards as any computer record, and the 
requirement of showing a connection of a person with the message. 
The former standard is more burdensome: as with early telegraph sys-
tems, the susceptibility of computer systems to mistake or fraud con-
cerns many observers.122 Authentication of a computer record 
consists of a showing of the "process or system used to produce a re-
sult and showing that the process or system produces an accurate re-
sult."123 Such a standard requires a showing of the reliability of the 
equipment and programs used, the method o( entering and storing the 
data in the system, and the measures taken to assure the accuracy of 
the system. 124 
118. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. Because courts have considered testi· 
mony beyond the face ofa writing to determine whether a writing is "signed," see CORBIN, supra 
note 24, § 522; electronic mail message headings, which indicate a message's source and time of 
delivery, see BANKS, supra note 8, at 133-35, may prove useful in cases concerning the Statute of 
Frauds. 
119. See, e.g., Leila Davis, Retailers Go Shopping for EDl DATAMATION, Mar. 1, 1989, at 
53. 
120. See Averil Reisman, EDI Clearing New Paths for Distribution, COMPUTER & 
SOFTWARE NEWS, May 23, 1988, at 61. 
121. See BANKS, supra note 8, at 175. 
122. One analyst noted that "[a] skilled programmer who understands a given computer 
system and has direct access to the system can alter the data stored within the system, leaving no 
trace of the alteration." James A. Sprowl, Evaluating the Credibility of Computer-Generated 
Evidence, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 547, 560 (1976). 
123. FED. R. Evm. 90l(b)(9). 
124. See William A. Fenwick & Gordon K. Davidson, Use of Computerized Business Records 
as Evidence, 19 JURIMETRICS J., Fall 1978, at 9, 19. Because the Federal Rules of Evidence 
already contemplate computer records, this Note considers only electronic mail transmission 
systems, rather than the underlying computer systems used to generate and store electronic mail 
messages. However, as electronic mail systems become increasingly common in small offices, 
parties wishing to introduce such evidence may find these authentication standards extremely 
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No court has yet considered what constitutes competent evidence 
that an individual sent an electronic offer or acceptance.125 This stan-
dard of authentication should depend upon the reliability of electronic 
mail systems. The more confidence placed in a medium, the more def-
erence the medium should receive for authentication and other eviden-
tiary issues. As with other media employing electricity, errors in 
electronic mail messages may result from low quality transmission 
lines, radio interference, electrical storms, power supplies, various 
properties of switching and signaling equipment, and numerous other 
sources. 126 These concerns are amplified for systems like electronic 
mail, which transmit encoded characters, 127 rather than the encoded 
images of telefacsimile machines128 or converted sound of tele-
phones.129 The consequences of an unintended alteration of the trans-
mitted electrical signal may result in altered characters, rather than 
miscolored dots and completely incomprehensible images on a telefac-
simile, or mere background noise and garbled voices over a telephone. 
To negate these sources of error and increase the accuracy of trans-
mitted data in electronic mail systems, designers have developed error-
correcting protocols.130 Such protocols introduce redundancy into the 
data when it is sent.131 The transmission of a message multiple times 
presents a simple redundancy, 132 although more efficient schemes have 
been developed.133 Despite these protocols, designers expect unde-
tected errors to occur; 134 a typical error-correcting protocol provides a 
probability of undetected error on the order of three bits, or digits in 
the binary number system employed by electronic computer sys-
onerous. Unlike corporate mainframe computers, the personal computers used in these smaller 
settings typically employ unaudited software with few security measures. Whether courts should 
develop authentication standards which are more appropriate for typical personal computer sys-
tems is outside the scope of this Note. 
125. See Dziewit et al., supra note 13, at 87. 
126. See Jack Douglass, How To Find Phone-line Faults and What To Do About Them, 
DATA CoMMUNICATIONS, Sept. 1988, at 179. 
127. See BANKS, supra note 8, at 119-24. 
128. See id. at 36. 
129. JoEL EFFRON, DATA COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES 18-27 
(1984). 
130. MAN YOUNG RHEE, ERROR-CORRECTING CODING THEORY 8-10 (1989). 
131. JERRY FITZGERALD, BUSINESS DATA COMMUNICATIONS: BASIC CONCEPTS, SECUR-
ITY, AND DESIGN 243 (1984). 
132. PIERRE LAFRANCE, FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS IN COMMUNICATION 202-03 (1990). 
133. Id. at 297-370. 
134. Id. at 297. 
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terns, 135 in one hundred million. 136 Although this appears to be an 
extremely strong assurance of data accuracy, modern communication 
systems transmit a phenomenal number of bits. For example, the 
newly proposed gigabit network, a national electronic mail network, 
will operate at speeds of one billion bits per second or more. 137 If 
systems designers employ the aforementioned error-correcting code, 
operators of this system could discover as many as thirty transmission 
errors each second in a "worst-case" scenario. Fortunately, proper 
use of powerful error-correcting protocols can provide nearly error-
free data transmission, 138 and this network need not be nearly so error 
prone. Service providers may simply dispatch more redundant data 
with transmitted messages, allowing more accurate operation of an er-
ror-correcting protocol, although decreasing the rate by which the net-
work may transmit information.139 
Considerations of these design trade-offs should weigh heavily dur-
ing the establishment of a presumption of reliability, and therefore the 
appropriate standard of authentication, for various electronic mail sys-
tems. Thus, courts should consider testimony concerning a system's 
error-correcting protocols, as well as the method, accuracy, and secur-
ity of its storage and retrieval mechanisms, 140 to reach a sensible deter-
mination of the system's reliability and susceptibility to fraud and 
error. Ordinary standards of authentication are appropriate only if 
system designers have implemented protocols which ensure the relia-
ble exchange of information. Such a standard not only prevents fraud, 
perjury, and mistake, but encourages business users to utilize those 
135. Each binary digit, or bit, has a value of 0 or 1, corresponding to the presence of low or 
high voltage in the transmitted electrical signal. Computers and electronic mail systems repre-
sent alphabetic or numerical characters with a fixed number of bits. System designers usually set 
this number at eight, and call the 8-bit units "bytes." See FRED HALSALL, INTRODUCflON TO 
DATA COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER NETWORKS 11 (1985). If an undetected transmis-
sion error alters the value of one or more bits, the receiving unit will interpret the byte as a 
different character. For example, a system employing the Extended Binary-Coded Decimal In· 
terchanged Code (EBCDIC) will transmit the number "7" as "11110111." Ifthe right-most bit 
is changed during transmission to "O," the receiving unit will read "11110110," which is then 
interpreted as the number "6" under the EBCDIC. See BRITT RORABAUGH, DATA COMMUNI· 
CATIONS AND LoCAL AREA NETWORKING HANDBOOK 16, 19 (1985). 
136. This protocol adds 25 bits to each block of 1000 bits according to the "cyclical redun-
dancy check" detecting scheme. This figure assumes use of an "automatic repeat request" sys-
tem, which requests data retransmission once it detects an error. FITZGERALD, supra note 131, 
at 249. 
137. See John Markoff, Fiber Optics: New Networks/or the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, 
at 39; Research on Gigabit Networks Jointly Funded by NSF and DARPA, PR NEWSWIRE, June 
8, 1990. 
138. See EFFRON, supra note 129, at 163. 
139. See FITZGERALD, supra note 131, at 243. 
140. A simple example of one system design feature which courts should consider is the 
ability of users to modify the text of received messages. While commercial electronic mail sys-
tems like AT&T Mail, DASnet, MCI Mail, and TELEMAIL allow users to reread, delete, and 
forward messages, along with many other services, they prevent users from tampering with re-
ceived messages. See BANKS, supra note 8, at 191-204. 
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electronic mail services with accuracy appropriate for commercial 
dealings. 
Neither the often maligned141 Statute of Frauds nor the eviden-
tiary requirement of authentication impeded the adoption of telegra-
phy or teletype as valid means of conducting and memorializing 
commercial transactions. When considering these media, courts relied 
primarily on their commercial acceptance, rather than on a more tech-
nical evaluation of their reliability or susceptibility to fraud. Under 
this approach, the widespread acceptance of both telefacsimile and 
electronic mail technology should readily extinguish a Statute of 
Frauds defense for contracts conducted through these technologies. 
However, concerns over increased opportunity for fraud and mistake 
in new technologies may warrant more difficult standards of authenti-
cation for these technologies, particularly for electronic mail networks 
that employ insufficient error-correcting techniques. 
II. THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE 
The Best Evidence Rule presents separate evidentiary concerns for 
users of telefacsimile machines and electronic mail systems. 142 The 
Rule provides that the offering party must produce an available origi-
nal to prove the terms of a document. 143 Here too, characteristics of 
these novel media strain legal conceptions that are ordinarily straight-
forward. Unlike copying by hand or photocopier, the processes em-
ployed by telefacsimile and electronic mail systems make proper 
identification of an "original document" difficult. Curiously, an analy-
sis of available authority indicates that the rules governing electronic 
mail, the newest media considered here, are largely settled, 144 while 
those concerning telefacsimile machines, the earliest of these technolo-
gies, 145 remain unsettled. Section II.A of this Part reviews the devel-
opment of the Best Evidence Rule, including its reach to electronic 
mail messages. Section II.B argues that telefacsimiles should also be 
considered as best evidence within the scope of this rule. 
141. See, e.g., Francis M. Burdick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 273 
(1916). 
142. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 89, at 69; Dziewit et al., supra note 13, at 89-90; Anita 
Micossi, Paperless Office: Legal Liability, 17 COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS DECISIONS, July 
15, 1985, at 16. 
143. McCoRMICK, supra note 23, § 230. Rule 1002 of the Federal Rules of Evidence pro-
vides, "[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, record-
ing, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of 
Congress." FED. R. Evrn. 1002. 
144. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that accurate computer printouts of data such as 
stored electronic mail messages are original documents for the purposes of the Best Evidence 
Rule. See infra text accompanying notes 164-67. 
145. The concept of transmitting fixed images through electrical signals predates even teleg-
raphy. Alexander Bain first conceived of the facsimile machine in 1848. See JOHN G. TRUXAL, 
THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC MESSAGES 482 (1990). 
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A. The Development of the Best Evidence Rule 
Scholars have linked the Best Evidence Rule with the ancient 
pleading doctrine of profert in curia. 146 This doctrine essentially re-
quired a plaintiff to allege that he could produce a document on which 
his suit was founded. 147 The rule requiring production of original doc-
uments grew gradually out of this doctrine, 148 reaching its apotheosis 
in 1700 as Chief Justice Holt said "the best proof that the nature of the 
thing will afford is only required."149 Most modem commentators 
give a more narrow reading to the Best Evidence Rule, confining it to 
a requirement that parties produce available original documents rather 
than copies. 150 Observers differ on the appropriate rationale for the 
Best Evidence Rule; possible theories include a desire to prevent fraud, 
cognizance of the high probability of error when individuals manually 
transcribe copies, and belief that a substantial risk of error exists when 
the terms of a writing are disclosed through oral testimony.151 
The development of telegraphy introduced a new wrinkle into this 
doctrine. Jurisdictions differed on whether the "original" writing was 
the message as delivered to the telegraph company for transmission, or 
the telegram ultimately received. 152 These cases framed the issue as 
one of contract law rather than evidence.153 Some courts considered 
the telegraph company to be the agent of an individual sending a 
message.154 As such, the sender was responsible for the telegram's 
contents even in case of an error. 155 This substantive law dictated that 
the telegram as received was the original. 156 Other courts deemed em-
ployee rather than agency status more appropriate for telegraph com-
panies, and denied the existence of a contract formed on the basis of 
146. 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 168 (1926). 
147. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (6th ed. 1990). 
148. Edward W. Cleary & John W. Strong, The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in Con· 
text, 51 IowA L. REv. 825, 825 (1966). 
149. Ford v. Hopkins, 1 Salk. 283, 91 Eng.Rep. 250 (K..B. 1700). 
150. McCoRMICK, supra note 23, § 229. But see Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Princi· 
pie, 13 IOWA L. REV. 227, 227 (1988). 
151. McCORMICK, supra note 23, § 231. 
152. 29 AM. JuR. 2o Evidence § 474 (1967). 
153. See McCoRMICK, supra note 23, § 235 (When considering whether a document is an 
original or a copy, "[t]he question to be asked •.. is whether, under the substantive law, the 
creation, publication, or other use of [the document] may be viewed as affecting the rights of the 
parties in a way material to the litigation."). 
154. See, e.g., Des Arc Oil Mill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 201 S.W. 273, 274 (Ark. 1918); 
Brooke v. Western Union Tel. Co., 46 S.E. 826, 826 (Ga. 1904); J.L. Price Brokerage Co. v. 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 199 S.W. 732, 733 (Mo. 1917). 
155. See Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 10 A. 495, 497 (Me. 1887). 
156. See Collins v. Western Union Tel. Co., 41 So. 160, 162 (Ala. 1906); Anheuser-Busch 
Brewing Co. v. Hutmacher, 21 N.E. 626, 628 (Ill. 1889); Magie v. Herman, 52 N.W. 909, 909 
(Minn. 1892). 
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transmissions where an error had occurred.157 Thus, the original doc-
ument was the message delivered to the telegraph company. 158 
The impact of the Best Evidence Rule softened considerably as du-
plication techniques developed beyond scriveners toiling in candle-lit 
halls. Initially, courts excepted carbon copies from the Rule, under 
the rationale that the same impression made both original and dupli-
cate.159 Courts labeled such copies "duplicate originals."160 Photo-
copies and products of other technologies lacked this characteristic, 
but the Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records 
as Evidence Act161 and Article X of the Federal Rules of Evidence162 
ultimately accepted them as best evidence as well. One court justified 
this result by noting that the chief concern of the Best Evidence Rule 
was 
the human frailty of a copier, as a Bob Cratchit, fingers numbed by the 
cold in the counting house and fraught with anxiety over the health of 
Tiny Tim, might distractedly misplace a decimal, invert a pair of digits 
or drop a line. A Xerox machine, by way of contrast, does not worry 
about Tiny Tim and does not, therefore, misplace decimal points, invert 
digits, drop lines, or suffer any of the mental lapses that flesh is heir 
to.163 
The latest communications technology, electronic mail, presents 
perplexing questions regarding the original document requirement of 
the Best Evidence Rule. Since this medium employs intangible elec-
tronic transmissions instead of paper during the communications pro-
cess, determination of which - if any - of the transmissions should 
be considered an original document is difficult. Most of these issues 
have been mooted, however, by Article X of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which considers a broad range of computer-generated docu-
ments.164 As with telegrams, determination of the original electronic 
mail transmission will be governed by a jurisdiction's substantive law 
of contracts. Federal Rule of Evidence 1001(3) then provides that 
"[i]f data are stored on a computer or similar device, any printout or 
157. See Annotation, Telegraph Company as Agent of Sender so as To Bind Him as Against 
Addressee by Mistake in Transmitting Message, 42 A.L.R. 293, 296-98 (1926). 
158. See, e.g., Smith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138, 145 (1880); Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487, 
488 (1869). 
159. McCoRMICK, supra note 23, § 236. 
160. See Toho Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 265 F.2d 418, 423-24 
(2d Cir. 1959). 
161. 9 U.L.A. 417 (1951). Under this widely adopted act, regularly kept photocopies of 
business and public records are admissible without regard to the original. 
162. FED. R. EVID. 1001-1008. 
163. Thompson v. State, 488 A.2d 995, 1006 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
164. See FED. R. Evm. 1001 advisory committee's note ~ 1 ("Present day techniques have 
expanded methods of storing data, yet the essential form which the information ultimately as-
sumes for usable purposes is words and figures. Hence the considerations underlying the rule 
dictate its expansion to include computers, photographic systems, and other modem 
developments."). 
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other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is 
an 'original.' " 165 Since electronic mail messages are ordinarily stored 
on general purpose computers or similar systems, their introduction 
into evidence poses no difficulties under the current language of the 
Best Evidence Rule. 166 Under this rule, computer printouts of elec-
tronic mail transmissions should fare as well as telegrams for purposes 
of determining the best evidence.167 
B. Telefacsimiles and the Best Evidence Rule 
Surprisingly, questions linger over the application of the Best Evi-
dence Rule to telefacsimiled documents, despite the maturity and 
broader use of telefacsimile machines relative to electronic mail. Of 
course, the substantive law of contracts governs transactions con-
ducted by telefacsimile. But unlike the other technologies considered 
here, the telefacsimile transmits images of documents, prompting 
some courts to draw analogies with photocopiers rather than telegra-
phy or teletype. 168 Indeed, the term "telefacsimile" itself implies du-
plication as well as communications capabilities. Consideration of the 
telefacsimile machine as a duplication technology, albeit as one more 
susceptible to error or fraud than a modern photocopier, 169 adds un-
certainty to the potential admissibility of telefacsimiles within the Best 
Evidence Rule. The few courts that have considered this issue have 
approved telefacsimiled documents under the Rule, 170 although at 
least one dissenting voice exists. 111 
Several arguments support the majority position. First, the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence may be read to include telefacsimiled docu-
ments as duplicates, which are admissible to the same extent as an 
original.172 The definition of duplicate includes "a counterpart pro-
duced by ... electronic rerecording, ... or by other equivalent tech-
niques which accurately reproduces the original."173 Despite the 
165. FED. R. Evrn. 1001(3). 
166. Assurance that the message as stored is the one that the sender originally forwarded is 
presumably met by the authentication requirements for such messages. See supra notes 121-39 
and accompanying text. 
167. But see WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 10.5 (noting two somewhat attenuated ambiguities 
with respect to the Best Evidence Rule and electronic mail messages, and arguing that the Rule 
should not apply to such messages). 
168. See, e.g., People v. May, 557 N.Y.S.2d 203 (App. Div.), app. denied, 561 N.E.2d 900 
(1990). 
169. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
170. May, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 204; State v. Hutchison, No. 89-2148-CR-NM, 1990 Wis. App. 
LEXIS 303 (Apr. 11, 1990). 
171. See Barraclough v. Secretary of State for the Envt., C0/47/89 (Q.B. July 19, 1989) 
(LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) ("In my view [a telefacsimile] is not an original document . 
. . .'" (quoting In re A Company (No. 002634 of 1987) (unreported))). 
172. FED. R. Evrn. 1003. 
173. FED. R. Evrn. 1001(4). 
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chance of error during telefacsimile machine transmissions,174 few 
would argue that telefacsimiled documents are ordinarily inaccurate 
reproductions. The telefacsimile machine may be distinguished from 
the more localized duplication techniques mentioned in the Federal 
Rules, 175 however, because it is primarily a communications device· 
which operates through long-distance duplication. 
A second argument for admission of telefacsimiles under the Best 
Evidence Rule concedes that telefacsimiles are physically only copies, 
but contends that they are the documents actually relied upon by one 
party in a commercial setting.176 As such, telefacsimiles should be 
treated as legally operative originals. Courts have accepted this rea-
soning in other contexts, 177 and have also adopted local rules allowing 
attorneys to file court documents through the telefacsimile machine. 178 
These courts consider, and often stamp, telefacsimiled filings as "origi-
nal" when received, tacitly approving this argument. 179 
An examination of the purposes of the Best Evidence Rule also 
demonstrates that it should not bar the admission of telefacsimiles.180 
Telefacsimile machines do not generate the kinds of error which moti-
vated the Best Evidence Rule. 181 Unlike manual copying, the telefac-
simile process cannot invert, delete, or insert characters into a writing. 
Although errors such as line or page skipping occur infrequently, 182 
telefacsimile machine users typically adopt protocols, such as number-
ing the pages and paragraphs of telefacsimiled documents, to ensure 
accurate communication.183 Judicial acceptance of computer gener-
ated evidence, which is more prone to mistake or fraud than a telefac-
simile, 184 further indicates that telefacsimiles should be adopted as 
best evidence. 
As commercial use of telefacsimiles becomes commonplace, courts 
174. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
175. See FED. R. Evm. 1001(4) (mentioning "a counterpart produced by the same impres-
sion as the original, ... photography, ... mechanical or electronic re-recording ... [and] chemi-
cal reproduction .... "). 
176. See WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 10.5. 
177. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, 568 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (Here, a bank 
officer allowed a loan in reliance upon either a telefacsimile or a photocopy of a telefacsimile of a 
fraudulent letter. The court upheld the admissibility of this document on other grounds, but 
mentioned the argument that the bank had relied on the telefacsimile. The court also upheld the 
defendant's conviction of wire fraud.). 
178. See Sokasits, supra note 8; Bordman, supra note 93, at 1370-73. 
179. See Wright, supra note 89. 
180. See supra text accompanying note 151; see also Bordman, supra note 93, at 1383 
("Faxed documents of undisputed accuracy ... are sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted as 
primary evidence."). 
181. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
183. See Wright, supra note 89. 
184. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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will increasingly be called upon to consider their evidentiary status. 
An anomalous invalidation of telefacsimiles under the Best Evidence 
Rule would only serve to inhibit business users from taking full advan-
tage of a useful communications tool. Past judicial cognizance of the 
increasing reliability of and reliance upon communications, duplica-
tion, and computer technologies should serve as useful precedents for 
courts facing this novel issue. 
Ill. LIABILITY ALLOCATION 
Although most users consider telegraph, teletype, telefacsimile, 
and electronic mail technologies to be extremely reliable, 185 communi-
cation errors still occur. Sources of these errors range from atmos-
pheric phenomena to properties of the transmitting equipment 
itself. 186 If any of these events takes place, the contents of the 
message, including key contractual terms such as price or quantity, 
may be altered.187 This Part examines the legal consequences of such 
modifications. Section III.A evaluates competing views on whether an 
offeror is bound by the contractual terms as he sent them, or as they 
were received, through telegraph and teletype systems. This section 
also explores the potential liability of the telegraph or teletype com-
pany for such lapses. Section 111.B applies these standards to telefac-
simile and electronic mail systems, while also noting the significance of 
modern business practices and error-correcting protocols to the devel-
opment of appropriate liability allocation standards. This Part con-
cludes that the competing views of liability allocation rest on theories 
of agency, common carriage, and contract law, rather than character-
istics of individual media, and argues that these doctrines should be 
unaffected by the advent of new technologies. 
A. Telegraph and Teletype 
As a consequence of the frailty of early telegraphy, courts heard a 
large number of cases concerning transmission errors altering crucial 
contract terms. 188 From these decisions, two views on the validity of 
the modified contract and the liability of the telegraph company 
emerged. A minority of cases considered the telegraph company to be 
the offeror's agent, and bound the offeror to the terms of the message 
185. See, e.g., Western Twine Co. v. Wright, 78 N.W. 942, 943-44 (S.D. 1899) (telegraphy); 
Charles Christian, Telex Holds Its Own, 131 Souc. J, 880 (1987) (teletype); Sokasits, supra note 
8, at 535 (telefacsimile machine); Report and Model Trading Agreement, supra note 9, at 1686 
(electronic mail). 
186. See supra text accompanying note 126. 
187. See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, The Executive Computer: New Modems Pick Up the Pace, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1988, § 3, at 11 ("[I]t is wise to pause and reflect on the dangers of high-
speed transmission .... [T]he accidental introduction of an extra goose egg or two in a batch of 
contract bids can cost you more than a night's sleep."). 
188. See Annotation, supra note 157. 
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as delivered in its modified form. 189 Since the offeror had selected the 
telegraph as its communications medium, courts reasoned that the of-
feror was the appropriate party to bear the burden of miscommunica-
tion.190 The offeror could, however, seek damages from the telegraph 
company for its negligent conduct.191 These courts cast telegraph 
companies as common carriers, held them to a correspondingly high 
standard of care192 and voided attempts by telegraph companies to 
limit liability by contract.193 
The majority of the courts facing this issue, although similarly con-
sidering telegraph companies to be common carriers, came to a much 
different result. These courts used this status not to hold the company 
to a high standard of care, but to deny an agency relationship between 
the carrier and its customer.194 These courts recognized that tele-
graph companies did not have the offeror's authority to alter a submit-
ted message, 195 nor could the offeror supervise the company's 
operations.196 Instead, the telegraph company merely served the func-
tion of providing rapid communication.197 Furthermore, because each 
party had agreed to different terms, these courts denied the existence 
of a contract.198 These decisions allowed injured parties to recover 
damages from the telegraph company for negligent conduct, 199 but up-
held the contractual limit on liability maintained by the telegraph 
company, which typically restricted recovery to the transmission fee 
unless the user paid a higher fee for multiple transmissions. 200 
In sum, then, the majority of courts adopted the principle that par-
ties could not form a contract through erroneously altered telegraph 
transmissions. A significant minority of jurisdictions,201 however, 
maintained that the sender was the principal of the telegraph com-
pany, and bound him to altered contract terms. 
The seminal case of Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Com-
pany, 202 concerning telegraphic communications between principal 
189. See, e.g., Des Aic Oil Mill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 201 S.W. 273 (Ark. 1918); J.L. 
Price Brokerage Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 199 S.W. 732 (Mo. 1917); Brooke v. Western 
Union Tel. Co., 46 S.E. 826 (Ga. 1904). 
190. See Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 10 A. 495, 497 (Me. 1887). 
191. See Des Aic Oil Mill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 201 S.W. 273 (Aik. 1918). 
192. Se~ Ayer, 10 A. at 496. 
193. See 10 A. at 496. 
194. See Annotation, supra note 157, at 293. 
195. See, e.g., Pegram v. Western Union Tel. Co., 6 S.E. 770, 773 (N.C. 1888). 
196. See, e.g., Pepper v. Western Union Tel. Co., 11 S.W. 783, 784 (Tenn. 1889). 
197. See, e.g., Smith v. Western Union Tel. Co., 83 Ky. 104, 113-14 (1885). 
198. See, e.g., Pepper, 11 S.W. at 784-85. 
199. See, e.g., Pegram, 6 S.E. at 770. 
200. See, e.g., Wann v. Western Union Tel. Co., 37 Mo. 472, 482-83 (1866). 
201. See Annotation, supra note 157, at 293. 
202. 154 U.S. 1 (1894). 
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and agent, rather than a commercial transaction between parties at 
arm's length, supports the majority view. Here, a wool dealer sent an 
encoded message to a purchaser, opting for the standard telegraph 
transmission fee, rather than the greater fee which included a confir-
matory retransmission. A transmission error resulted in the 
overpurchase of wool and a loss for the dealer. The Supreme Court 
refused to hold the telegraph company liable, characterizing telegra-
phy as a media "peculiarly liable to mistakes."203 Interestingly, it re-
jected the categorization of telegraph companies as common carriers, 
yet held them to an analogous standard of care,204 and validated the 
telegraph company's restriction of liability.205 Judge (later Justice) 
Cardozo faced similar facts in Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of 
America. 206 The Kerr court relied upon Hadley v. Baxendale 207 in 
stating that the telegraph company's liability would be limited to the 
transmission fee when the telegraph's contents did not disclose the na-
ture of the transaction, and thus did not make the company aware of 
the probability and magnitude of the harm that might result from its 
carelessness. 208 
The majority position on liability eroded as courts increasingly rec-
ognized telegraphy as "essential and indispensable ... to the commer-
cial and social interests of the whole world."209 Although most courts 
continued to reject contracts formed on the basis of modified transmis-
sions, they also invalidated contractual limitations on liability estab-
lished by telegraph companies.21° Courts offered two reasons for this 
change. First, courts recognized that after years of experience and 
technological improvements, telegraphy was no longer a fragile art, 
but a robust and accurate communications medium.211 Second, courts 
that had characterized infant telegraph companies as poor, struggling 
corporations charging small fees for message transmission were sur-
prisingly candid in their realization that many telegraph companies 
had become "immensely rich [from] charging a great deal more than it 
203. 154 U.S. at 14. 
204. 154 U.S. at 14. 
205. 154 U.S. at 15-16. 
206. 157 N.E. 140 (N.Y. 1927). 
207. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). This case, a staple of contracts courses, held that a defendant 
will not be liable for consequential damages resulting from a failure or delay in completing a 
contract, unless the defendant was aware of the circumstances giving rise to those damages. In 
Hadley v. Baxendale, the owners of a com mill sued a carrier which had failed to deliver timely 
an engine shaft. Without the shaft, the plaintiffs could not operate their mill. The court denied 
the plaintiffs damages for lost profits, stating that in ordinary course, such damages would not 
have occurred, and that the carrier had no knowledge of the special circumstances present here. 
208. 157 N.E. at 141. 
209. Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., 37 S.W. 904, 905 (Mo. 1896). 
210. See, e.g., Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 P. 910, 914 (Idaho 1910); Tyler, Ull-
man & Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 60 Ill. 421, 435-38 (1871); Reed, 37 S.W. at 904-05. 
211. See Reed, 37 S.W. at 905; Tyler, Ullman & Co., 60 Ill. at 435-36. 
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actually costs to transmit such messages and to give them a fair return 
upon the capital investment in the business."212 These jurisdictions 
typically saw an altered transmission as prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. Evidence of bad weather, disturbed lines, or other conditions 
beyond the control of the telegraph company could rebut this pre-
sumption.213 Other courts taking the majority view did not step quite 
so far, but found telegraph companies liable for their gross, as distin-
guished from ordinary, negligence while handling messages.214 
Courts have yet to apply these standards to teletype transmission 
errors, perhaps because of the reliability of this technology. Commu-
nication errors may occur, however, even when contracting parties 
employ this trustworthy medium. The sender might misdial the recip-
ient's teletype number.215 Also, the recipient's teleprinter might run 
out of paper during a transmission, continuing to receive, but not rec-
ord, the incoming message.216 Judge Posner considered this scenario 
in Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 217 where the defendant bank failed 
to comply with a teletyped transfer of funds request. The bank's slop-
pily maintained teletype machines were the likely cause; the request 
was never printed or simply mishandled. 218 
Despite the likely source of the transmission error, the Evra court 
held that the sender should have taken additional precautions, for 
"messages sometimes get lost or delayed in transit among [parties] lo-
cated 5000 miles apart .... "219 The court also rejected the district 
court's conclusion that a bank should realize deleterious consequences 
can spring from a failure to fu1fi11 a transfer of funds request.220 
Although contract formation was not at issue in this decision, the 
court's rather generous application of Hadley v. Baxendale indicates 
that the risk of a teletype transmission error may rest with the party 
that selected the media. Of course, this approach is identical to the 
rationale supporting the minority view of liability allocation for teleg-
raphy. Evra thus suggests that at least one court will enforce agree-
ments formed through altered teletype transmissions, rather than 
following the majority view which denies contract status to altered 
communications by telegraph. 
212. Strong, 109 P. at 914. 
213. See, e.g., Rittenhouse v. Independent Line of Tel., 44 N.Y. 263, 265 (1870). 
214. See, e.g., Hart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 6 P. 637, 640 (Cal. 1885); Wann v. Western 
Union Tel. Co., 37 Mo. 472, 482 (1866). But see Trammel v. Western Union Tel. Co., 129 Cal. 
Rptr. 361, 370-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Strong, 109 P. at 916-17; Reed, 37 S.W. at 906 (denying a 
distinction between gross and ordinary negligence). 
215. See Afovos Shipping Co. SA v. Pagnan, 1 W.L.R. 195, 198 (1983). 
216. See WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 4.2. 
217. 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
218. 673 F.2d at 953. 
219. 673 F.2d at 957. 
220. 673 F.2d at 959. 
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B. Telefacsimile and Electronic Mail 
An examination of the arguments supporting the competing views 
on liability allocation for telegraph and teletype transmission errors 
provides guidance for cases involving telefacsimile and electronic mail 
systems. Most of the arguments depend very little upon the specific 
nature of the technology, suggesting that either doctrine of liability 
will readily extend to telefacsimile and electronic mail systems. 
Courts which deny the formation of a contract because of an altered 
transmission should continue to do so regardless of which medium is 
employed. Furthermore, a jurisdiction's acceptance or denial of 
agency status for telegraph companies should extend to the newer 
communications technologies. 
A more critical distinction may be the potential categorization of 
electronic communications service providers as common carriers. 
Most courts, regardless of their view of liability allocation, considered 
telegraph companies to be common carriers, or placed similar respon-
sibilities upon them.221 Like traditional common carriers, telegraph 
companies provide a specified service at a standard price, engage in a 
business in which the public is deeply concerned, and are bound to 
serve all customers equally.222 Although telegraph companies do not 
ship goods along a route in the manner of a traditional common car-
rier, the transmission of messages along a telegraph wire provides a 
ready analogy. These rationales are less persuasive for teletype service 
providers, telefacsimile machine manufacturers, and electronic mail 
service providers. A crucial distinction exists between an individual 
using owned equipment as opposed to hiring another to transmit a 
message. In contrast to the small fee imposed on the sender of a tele-
gram, the user of these systems must make a significant investment in 
terminals, printers, modems and telefacsimile machines. Further, 
such devices simply present different methods of using the existing tel-
ephone network. Indeed, for many systems, particularly telefacsimile 
machines, courts will more accurately view service providers as more 
closely analogous to product manufacturers than common carriers. 
To the extent either view of liability allocation for modified tele-
graph transmissions relies upon the categorization of telegraph compa-
nies as common carriers, the expansion of that view to more modern 
communication system providers, which are even further removed 
from traditional ideas of common carriage than their predecessors, be-
comes increasingly suspect. Since common carrier status is just one of 
several available rationales for each position,223 however, its weight is 
221. See supra note 194 and accompanying text; Phil Nichols, Note, Redefining "Common 
Carrier'~· The FCC's Attempt at Deregulation by Redefinition, 1987 DUKE L.J. 501, 508-09. 
222. See, e.g., Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 P. 910, 915-16 (Idaho 1910); Pegram v. 
Western Union Tel. Co., 6 S.E. 770, 772-73 (N.C. 1888). 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 188-200. 
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unlikely to be controlling. In this instance, then, the differing aspects 
of more recent communications technologies do not necessarily man-
date changing fundamental notions established during the rise of teleg-
raphy as a commercially accepted medium. 
Beneath the fundamental standards of liability allocation under the 
majority and minority views, however, lie details of application to the 
different technologies. Even under the majority view, if a transmission 
error results from ordinary or gross negligence, 224 liability will attach 
to a telegraph company, and thus perhaps to negligent manufacturers 
and users of telefacsimile machines as well. Like the teletypewriter in 
Evra, some telefacsimile machines continue to receive messages even 
when out ofpaper.225 These systems also cannot guarantee delivery of 
a telefacsimile to the intended recipient, particularly when the telefac-
simile machine is located in a busy mailroom. 226 A commercial part-
ner who allows his telefacsimile machine to run out of paper, or who 
misplaces an important telefacsimiled document, might be considered 
negligent.227 The product design itself might also be considered faulty, 
thus exposing the manufacturer to liability. 
Although theEvra court was not swayed by these arguments,228 its 
rationale that communications over thousands of miles are subject to 
some risk bears reconsideration. Transmissions over distances of this 
magnitude have become customary in the ordinary course of modern 
business. Telefacsimile machines are normally quite reliable whether 
the document is transmitted 5000 miles or the length of a city block; 
business users properly rely upon them for important communica-
tions. 229 Further, the allegedly negligent handling of the Evra plain-
tiff's teletyped message occurred not over the great distance 
mentioned by the court, but in the defendant's office after the data had 
safely arrived.230 The mishandling would have occurred no matter 
where the message's source. As business users also accept telefac-
224. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
225. See BANKS, supra note 8, at 53-54. 
226. See Beware! Fax Attacks/, supra note 91, at 60. 
227. The calculus of negligence might also consider the ease with which a telefacsimile's 
sender can verify its receipt. Typically, a sender can simply call the intended recipient minutes 
after entering a document into a telefacsimile machine. Such a duty of care is only appropriate 
for weighty transactions, however, given the inefficiency it engenders and the reliability of 
telefacsimile machines. 
228. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text. The court stated that the only issue 
before it "is whether [the plaintifi] was entitled to consequential damages." 673 F.2d at 955. 
However, the court was obviously unimpressed with the plaintiff's arguments that the defendant, 
a Swiss bank, was negligent. "[The plaintiff] should have known that even the Swiss are not 
infallible; that messages sometimes get lost or delayed in transit among three banks, two of them 
located 5000 miles apart, even when all banks are using reasonable care; and that therefore it 
should take its own precautions against the consequences - best known to itself - of a mishap 
that might not be due to anyone's negligence." 673 F.2d at 957. 
229. See Sokasits, supra note 8, at 535. 
230. 673 F.2d at 953. 
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simile machines as global communications tools, these liability issues 
warrant further consideration. Under either liability allocation 
scheme, then, a finding of negligence for mishandling of a commercial 
telefacsimiled document may be appropriate in facts similar to those of 
Evra, and the negligent party should bear the loss. 
The role of error-correcting protocols231 in the determination of 
negligence or breach of warranty also concerns telefacsimile machine 
manufacturers and electronic mail service providers. Under either a 
negligence or breach of warranty claim, plaintiffs will be able to 
demonstrate causation only with difficulty, since the presence of an 
error-correcting code does not immunize a system from altered trans-
missions. 232 If a plaintiff can show causation, courts may look to de-
sign standards to determine the adequacy of an existing error-
correcting code233 or whether a code should have been implemented at 
all.234 Currently, designers widely employ such protocols in electronic 
mail systems;235 use is less frequent but increasing in telefacsimile 
machines. 236 
Even if a system does incorporate an error-correcting code, the 
gigabit network's theoretical error rate237 seems uncomfortably high 
for many commercial users. Much like early telegraph transmissions, 
which were liable to the whims of unreliable machinery, bad weather, 
and inexperienced operators,238 electronic mail messages are subject to 
uncontrollable changes. Such an error rate might render this sort of 
electronic mail network "inherently unreliable" for commercial pur-
poses, as the Primrose court found for early telegraph systems.239 If 
so, electronic mail service providers would properly be able to limit 
their liability, except possibly in instances of gross negligence, under 
the standards the majority of these early courts provided.240 Of 
course, electronic mail, although it is a new technology, has been able 
to profit from decades of research and experience in the earlier com-
munications systems. Designers may also implement retransmissions 
or more accurate, albeit less efficient, error-correcting protocols for 
systems intended for commercial use. These features heighten the pro-
priety of a presumption of reliability, which applied to mature tele-
231. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text. 
232. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra note 137-39 and accompanying text. 
234. See Peter J. Denning, Human Error and the Search for Blame, 33 COMM. OF THE AssN. 
FOR CoMPUTING MACHINERY, Jan. 1990, at 6. 
235. See Jerry Pournelle, Chaos Manor Awards, BYTE, Apr. 1990, at 53, 66. 
236. See BANKS, supra note 8, at 40-41. 
237. See supra text accompanying note 138. 
238. See Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., 37 S.W. 904, 905 (Mo. 1896). 
239. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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graph systems, for electronic mail networks. 241 Although it is difficult 
to predict the path courts will take on this issue, factors such as the 
expectations of users, capabilities of the protocol employed, and 
promises of the service providers should influence their decision. 
While no electronic mail network can provide perfect reliability, this 
technology compares favorably with other media, and a presumption 
of reliability seems appropriate for typical systems. 
In sum, although courts have disagreed on the validity of contracts 
formed through altered telegrams and the resulting liability of tele-
graph companies, these conclusions are based upon differing theories 
of contract law, agency, and common carriage, rather than a careful 
consideration of the characteristics of telegraphy itself. 242 As a result, 
these theories of liability allocation are unlikely to change when courts 
consider new technologies such as the telefacsimile and electronic 
mail.243 However, in those jurisdictions where liability is based upon 
the inherent reliability of a communications medium or the negligence 
of its operators, telefacsimile machines and electronic mail systems 
present unique issues. Courts in these jurisdictions should pay careful 
attention to both the choices made during the design of communica-
tions systems and the expectations and customs of modern business 
users. 
CONCLUSION 
Much like early telegraph and teletype systems, telefacsimile ma-
chines and electronic mail networks present new means for parties to 
negotiate and memorialize commercial agreements. Although the 
speed and accuracy of these media make them highly desirable busi-
ness tools, their novel features strain traditional notions of contract 
law and evidence. Fortunately, the judicial experience with earlier 
communications technologies provides an appropriate framework for 
balancing competing concerns of efficiency and user protection from 
altered transmissions. The broad reading of the Statute of Frauds in 
this setting, along with deference to commercial acceptance of these 
devices, demonstrates that telefacsimiled and electronically mailed 
contracts should be as readily authenticated and admitted into evi-
dence as more traditional writings. Courts should be cognizant of the 
special characteristics of these technologies, however, and stand ready 
to exact heightened evidentiary showings where, as with certain elec-
tronic mail systems, the possibility of fraud or mistake seems great. 
Courts should also deem telefacsimiles and electronic mail 
241. This presumption is consistent with recent case law which subjects computer manufac-
turers to an increasing standard of care as vendors of a mature technology. See Baum, supra note 
16, at 53. 
242. See supra notes 188-200 and accompanying text. 
243. See supra text accompanying note 223. 
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messages to be the best evidence of the contracts they record. For 
electronic mail messages which have been stored on computers and 
printed, the Federal Rules of Evidence mandate this result. The im-
pact of the Best Evidence Rule on telefacsimiled contracts is not yet 
settled, but the policy of protection against fraud and mistake that 
motivates the Rule suggests that telefacsimiles are appropriate best ev-
idence. Courts should consider telefacsimiles to be duplicates or con-
ceptual originals, and parties should be allowed to enter such 
documents as the best evidence of the contracts they record under the 
current structure of the Rule. 
In the event an error modifies contractual terms as transmitted 
through a telefacsimile or electronic mail system, courts seeking to 
allocate liability will undoubtedly turn to contract law developed for 
telegraph and teletype systems. Although courts hold carriers liable 
for their negligent conduct, differing views of liability allocation gov-
ern when a contract's altered terms are not the result of negligence. 
Under the majority view, no contract exists when the offer and accept-
ance state different terms, and the carrier may limit its liability con-
tractually. A minority view binds the offeror to the terms of the 
altered contract, but allows him recourse against the carrier without 
regard to contractual limitations. The difference between these 
stances is due largely to varying notions of contract law, agency, and 
carriage, rather than different conceptions of the technologies them-
selves. As such, either doctrine of liability should readily apply to the 
latest communications technologies. 
The doctrines considered here present only a few of the potential 
legal problems facing commercial users of telefacsimiles and electronic 
mail systems. 244 Of course, further issues remain, and courts will un-
doubtedly encounter new communications media, like hypertext, 245 
the Integrated Services Digital Network,246 or technologies not yet 
dreamed of, long after they settle the rules for the technologies consid-
ered here. But the legal issues remain the same, whether the technol-
ogy is a lead pencil, telegraphy, or electronic mail. Any technology 
will challenge courts to consider fully the purposes, as well as the let-
ter, of the relevant legal principles, as well as the unique characteris-
tics of that technology. The importance of these decisions should not 
be underestimated, for they will determine if these technologies will 
become the foundation of our Information Age, or unfortunately be 
stifled by antiquated legal doctrine. 
244. Other issues include the evidentiary rule against hearsay, liability for fraud, and record-
keeping requirements. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 7. 
245. ELECTRONIC MESSAGING, supra note 2, at 21-23. 
246. See, e.g., ROBERT K. HELDMAN, ISDN IN THE INFORMATION MARKETPLACE (1988). 
